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AN ARGUMENT FOR REVIVING THE ACTUAL




A fundamental tenet of the Supreme Court's error
preservation jurisprudence is that a criminal' defendant's failure
to raise a legal claim, including a constitutional claim, during
court proceedings (whether in the trial court or on appeal)
"forfeits" 2 or "procedurally defaults" the claim on a subsequent
*Assistant Federal Public Defender, Southern District of Texas; Adjunct Professor of Law,
University of Houston Law Center; B.A. University of North Carolina, J.D. Columbia
University.
1. Although this article focuses on the procedural default doctrine in criminal cases,
its discussion is equally applicable to civil cases. See Bird v. Glacier Elec. Coop., Inc., 255
F.3d 1136, 1144-48 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that the procedural default doctrine applies
equally in criminal and civil cases); Crawford v. Falcon Drilling Co., Inc., 131 F.3d 1120,
1123-24 (5th Cir. 1997) (same). For reasons that are not entirely apparent, the vast bulk of
appellate case law addressing the issue of futility in objecting and its implications for error
preservation occurs in criminal cases. A few courts have addressed the futility issue in civil
cases. See e.g. Curtis Publg. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 143-44, 172 n. 1 (1967) (plurality
op. & Brennan, J., concurring) (excusing a procedural default of a First Amendment claim
where, at the time of trial, "there was strong precedent" against the claim); Murray v.
Anthony J. Bertucci Constr. Co., 958 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1992) (excusing a procedural
default in an admiralty case where there was a "solid wall of circuit authority" at the time
of the trial that would have made an objection "in vain").
2. In U.S. v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), the Supreme Court sought to clarify that the
term "forfeit" rather than "waiver" is the appropriate concept to refer to a litigant's
"failure to make a timely assertion of a right" which subjects the claim to a procedural
default analysis. Id. at 733. Conversely, "waiver" is the "intentional relinquishment of
abandonment of a known right." Id. In the procedural default context, a litigant typically
unwittingly "forfeits" rather than knowingly "waives" a claim later raised for the first
time on appeal or collateral review. Numerous lower courts even after Olano continue to
use the term "waiver" to refer to what is really a forfeiture. See e.g. U.S. v. Barnes, 278
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direct appeal or collateral attack of the defendant's conviction or
sentence.' Although it has spoken inconsistently on the issue
over the years, the Supreme Court's current approach is to
"default" a claim not raised in a prior proceeding even if the
court in that proceeding would have been utterly powerless to
grant relief on the claim in view of extant appellate precedent
that squarely foreclosed the claim.4
This article addresses the futility of objecting in view of
adverse binding precedent and its implications under the
procedural default doctrine, an issue that the Court has
addressed repeatedly, beginning in 1947 with Sunal v. Large,'
and most recently in 1998 in Bousley.6 This article contends that
as a matter of logic and equity the procedural default doctrine, as
a general rule, should not be applied when an inferior court
before which the defendant previously appeared (where a claim
was not raised) would have been powerless to grant relief on
that claim because then-governing precedent of a superior court
dictated rejection of the claim.
Applying the procedural default doctrine in such a situation
runs afoul of the centuries-old "fundamental maxim of
jurisprudence," 7 deeply rooted in common sense, that the law
does not require "useless," "vain," or "futile" acts.' "Good
F.3d 644, 646 (6th Cir. 2002). For clarity's sake, this article will use the term "procedural
default" to refer to the concept of a litigant's "forfeiture" of a claim later raised on direct
appeal or collateral review.
3. See e.g. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (procedural default at trial in state
court system); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (procedural default on appeal in
the state court system); Johnson v. U.S., 520 U.S. 461 (1997) (procedural default at trial in
the federal court system); Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (procedural default on
appeal in federal system).
4. Compare e.g. O'Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92, 93 (1966) (holding that futility of
objecting in light of extant precedent excused a procedural default), and Estelle v. Smith,
451 U.S. 454, 468 n. 12 (1981) (same holding as O'Connor), with Johnson v. U.S., 520
U.S. at 468 (holding that futility of objecting did not excuse a procedural default, but
reviewing unpreserved error as "plain error"), and Bousley, 523 U.S. 614 (holding that
futility did not constitute "cause" for procedural default). The conflicting holdings of these
cases are addressed in Section II1, infra.
5. 332 U.S. 174, 177-78 (1947).
6. 523 U.S. at 621-22.
7. Mehrtash v. Mehrtash, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 802, 805 (Cal. App., 4th Div. 2001).
8. Stated in various ways, the ancient maxim "lex non cogit ad inutilia," or "the law
does not know useless acts," has been a fundamental tenet in Anglo-American
jurisprudence for centuries. See Seaconsar Far East, Ltd. v. Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami
Iran, [1999] I Lloyd's Rep. 36, 39 (English Court of Appeal 1998); People v. Greene Co.
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judicial administration is not furthered by insistence on futile
procedure." 9 Furthermore, requiring defense counsel to object
on grounds that are clearly foreclosed by entrenched precedent
subjects them to possible sanctions for raising "frivolous"
claims.'°
This issue takes on great practical importance in view of
the Supreme Court's perennial practice of significantly altering
the existing legal landscape in the criminal law arena by (1)
outright overruling or seriously eroding precedent that
previously had foreclosed a claim; or (2) finding merit in a claim
that a consensus or near-consensus of lower courts had
previously rejected and that the Court never had addressed
previously." Under the Court's current procedural default
Supervisors, 12 Barb. 217, 1851 WL 5372, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851); see also Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980) ("The law does not require the doing of a futile act.");
Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 246 (1845) (" [T]he law never requires ... a vain act."); N.Y.,
New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. v. lannoti, 567 F.2d 166, 180 (2d Cir. 1977) ("The law
does not require that one act in vain."); Terminal Freight Handling Co. v. Solien, 444 F.2d
699, 707 (8th Cir. 1971) ("The law does not and should not require the doing of useless
acts."); Stevens v. U.S., 2 Ct. Cl. 95 (U.S. Ct. Cl. 1866) ("[T]he law does not require the
performance of a useless act."); Bohnen v. Harrison, 127 F. Supp. 232, 234 (N.D. I11.
1955) ("It is fundamental that the law does not require the performance of useless acts.");
In re Anthony B., 735 A.2d 893, 901 (Conn. 1999) ("It is axiomatic that the law does not
require a useless and futile act."); Wilmette Partners v. Hamel, 594 N.E.2d 1177, 1187 (II1.
App. 1992) (" [I]t is a basic legal tenet that the law never requires a useless act.").
9. Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 681 (1948).
10. See generally Brent E. Newton, When Reasonable Jurists Could Disagree: The
Fifth Circuit's Misapplication of the Frivolousness Standard, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process
157 (2001) (discussing the scenario when an appellate court finds a claim "frivolous"
based on prior precedent of that court that forecloses the claim even when other courts have
found merit in the claim); see also U.S. v. McGuire, 79 F.3d 1396, 1412 (5th Cir. 1996)
(Wiener, J., concurring) ("To penalize defendants for failing to challenge entrenched
precedent would only encourage frivolous objections and appeals."), vacated, 99 F.3d 671
(5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Meadows v. Holland, 831 F.2d 493, 501 (4th Cir. 1987) (en
banc) (Mumaghan, Phillips & Sprouse, J.J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's refusal to
excuse the procedural default based on extant, adverse precedent at trial as requiring
defense counsel to engage "in [a] recital of frivolous, non-valid matters [foreclosed under
extant law], for how could counsel say what was clearly not the law today would not
become the law tomorrow?").
11. See e.g. Atkins v. Va., 536 U.S. 304(2002) (overruling portion of Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302 (1989), and holding that a capital defendant's mental retardation bars his
execution); Ala. v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002) (limiting Scott v. Ill., 440 U.S. 367 (1979),
by holding that Sixth Amendment's right to counsel applied to misdemeanor cases where
probation or suspended sentence, as opposed to "actual imprisonment," imposed); Ring v.
Ariz., 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2432 (2002) (overruling Walton v. Ariz., 497 U.S. 639 (1990), and
holding that juries, not judges, must find aggravating circumstances in capital cases);
Apprendi v. N.J., 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (dramatically altering prior Supreme Court
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jurisprudence, criminal defendants who failed to object on a
legal ground that was then squarely foreclosed by governing
precedent and that only later became legally viable as a result of
supervening precedent are generally out of luck when they
attempt to raise the claim for the first time on direct appeal or
collateral review.
Such an inequitable and illogical application of the
procedural default doctrine should be abandoned. As discussed
below, the Supreme Court should significantly modify its
current approach to the futility issue. This article proposes such
a modification, which, if adopted, would excuse procedural
defaults when raising a claim at an earlier juncture in a case
actually would have been futile from an objective standpoint-
as opposed simply to being merely perceived as futile-and,
thus, would have served no legitimate purpose.
II. THE PROCEDURAL DEFAULT DOCTRINE AND ITS RECOGNIZED
EXCEPTIONS
The consequences of a procedural default are typically
harsh for a criminal defendant, whether in state or federal court.
A defendant in a state prosecution who did not raise a federal
constitutional claim in accordance with state procedural
requirements" and who subsequently raises a claim of error,
jurisprudence and overruling a virtual consensus among lower courts on the issue by
holding that any fact that increases maximum sentence is an "element" of offense that
must be submitted to jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt; state's label of fact as
"sentencing factor" not dispositive); U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (dramatically
altering prior Supreme Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence by holding that Congress
had exceeded its commerce regulatory authority by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)); U. S. v.
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) (overruling near consensus among lower courts by holding
that materiality of false statement is an "element" of 18 U.S.C. § 1001); McNally v. U.S.,
483 U.S. 350 (1987) (overruling consensus among lower courts by holding that federal
mail fraud statute was inapplicable to a defendant's defrauding a victim of "intangible"
right to "honest services"); Penty v. Lynaugh, supra (holding that Texas capital sentencing
statute unconstitutional as applied to the defendant's mitigating evidence of mental
retardation and child abuse; as dissenters noted, the majority's holding seriously retreated
from prior approval of Texas statute in Jurek v. Tex., 428 U.S. 262 (1976)); Batson v. Ky.,
476 U.S. 79 (1986) (overruling Swain v. Ala., 380 U.S. 202 (1965), by holding that
prosecutors may not use peremptory challenges to remove minority persons from jury
based on racial motives).
12. All jurisdictions in this country apply some form of the "contemporaneous
objection rule," in criminal and civil cases alike, which "requires an objection at the trial
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even a meritorious one, on direct appeal to the United States
Supreme Court 3 will not receive a ruling on the merits of the
claim if the state procedural bar is deemed "adequate," which
means that the state court's application of the state's procedural
rule served a "legitimate state interest." " Similarly, on collateral
review of a state defendant's conviction or sentence in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding,' 5 a defendant's constitutional claim
will not receive a merits ruling if the state courts applied an
"adequate" state law procedural ground unless the defendant
shows both "cause" for his procedural default and "prejudice"
resulting from the claimed error. 6 Failure to establish cause will
bar consideration of the claim as a threshold matter,
notwithstanding a showing of tremendous prejudice based on a
level in order to preserve an argument for appeal." Bader v. State, 40 S.W.3d 738, 743-44
(Ark. 2001); see generally Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88-89. In addition, the vast majority of
jurisdictions have a similar procedural default rule in criminal cases that provides that a
claim not raised on direct appeal cannot ordinarily be raised on collateral (i.e., habeas
corpus) review. See e.g. Ex Parte Pena, 71 S.W.3d 336, 338 n. 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002);
Oken v. State, 681 A.2d 30 (Md. 1996).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1994).
14. James v. Ky., 466 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1984); Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375-78
(2002). In addition to being "adequate," a state law ground must also be "independent" in
order to preclude federal review. A state law ground is "independent" if "resolution of [a]
state procedural question [does not] depend[ ] on a federal constitutional ruling." Stewart
v. Smith, 122 S.Ct. 2578, 2581 (2002) (per curiam).
15. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254 (2002).
16. See generally Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90-91. The federal courts will apply the cause-and-
prejudice standard only if the last state court to have reviewed the federal constitutional
claim procedurally defaulted the claim, see Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991);
Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989), or, if the claim was never raised in the state court
system (and, thus, not procedurally defaulted by the state courts), the federal courts will
apply the cause-and-prejudice standard if it is clear that the state courts would procedurally
default the claim if the defendant were to return to the state court system. Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989).Alternatively, if a defendant cannot show cause and
prejudice, he still may receive a merits ruling if he can show his "actual innocence" by a
preponderance of the evidence, Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), or show by clear and
convincing evidence that he was legally ineligible for the sentence imposed. See Sawyer v.
Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992); Haley v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 257, 264-65 (5th Cir. 2002).
The vast majority of defendants seeking to circumvent procedural defaults, of course,
cannot make such an alternative showing.
The Supreme Court has yet to decide the issue of whether, on direct review (as
opposed to federal habeas corpus review), a showing of "cause" and "prejudice" would
excuse the otherwise "adequate" procedural default ruling by a state court. As discussed
infra, at least when an objection would have been futile in view of then-governing
appellate precedent, such futility both renders a state court's procedural default ruling an
"inadequate" state law ground and constitutes "cause."
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constitutional error.'7 In a series of decisions during the past two
decades, the Supreme Court has held that, even if it would have
been "futile" to have raised the procedurally defaulted claim in
light of then-governing adverse appellate precedent, such futility
does not excuse a procedural default.'8
A defendant in a federal prosecution who did not object on
a particular legal ground in the trial court is subject to the "plain
error" variation of the procedural default doctrine on direct
appeal to a United States Court of Appeals or the United States
Supreme Court." In order to prevail under the plain error
standard, the defendant must establish on appeal that there was
(1) an error committed in the federal district court; (2) the error
was "plain" under the law in effect at the time of the lower
court proceedings or the law in effect at the time of the appeal;
(3) the error was sufficiently prejudicial in that it affected the
defendant's "substantial rights"; and (4) such a prejudicial error
"seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
the judicial proceedings." 20
The fourth prong of this plain error analysis vests
tremendous discretion in an appellate court to determine whether
such a showing has been made.2' That is, even if a federal
appellate court finds merit in the defendant's claim of
prejudicial plain error, the court still possesses discretion to
refuse to reverse the defendant's conviction or sentence based
on the procedural default. Such discretion to affirm the judgment
of the district court does not exist in a case of a meritorious
claim of prejudicial error that was not procedurally defaulted in
the lower court.2 In Johnson v. United States,23 the Supreme
Court held that the plain error standard applies to a procedurally
defaulted claim even if, at the time of the proceedings in the
district court, governing appellate precedent would have made
an objection utterly futile because a district court would have
17. See Meanes v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir. 1998).
18. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 130 (1982); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 534-35
(1986) (citing Engle); Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623 (citing Engle).
19. U.S. v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-35 (1993) (discussing Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)).
20. Id. at 735-37.
21. Id. at 735-36.
22. See e.g. U.S. v. Marrero, 486 F.2d 622, 627 (7th Cir. 1973) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P.
52(a)).
23. 520 U.S. 461 (1997).
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had no power to grant relief on the claim, which only later
became viable based on an intervening decision by the Supreme
Court.1
4
A federal defendant who failed to raise a claim on direct
appeal-whether or not it was preserved in the district court-
faces the same stringent "cause and prejudice" standard
applicable to state defendants in federal habeas corpus cases
when the federal defendant raises the claim for the first time on
collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.5 Just as it held in
Engel regarding state defendants, the Supreme Court in Bousley
held that there is no "futility" exception to the procedural
default doctrine for federal defendants on collateral review.26
In sum, according to the Supreme Court's current error
preservation jurisprudence, the fact that a procedurally defaulted
claim would have been foreclosed under extant appellate
precedent does not enable the defendant asserting it later to
escape either the plain error standard on a federal direct appeal
or the cause-and-prejudice standard on collateral review.
III. MIXED SIGNALS REGARDING FUTILITY AS AN EXCEPTION TO
THE PROCEDURAL DEFAULT DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court's first treatment of the futility issue
27occurred in 1947 in Sunal v. Large. In Sunal, two defendants,
Sunal and Kulick, were charged in federal court with draft
evasion in separate cases. At their 1945 trials, they attempted to
challenge their selective service classifications as erroneous as a
defense to the charges-both men claimed to be religious
ministers as opposed to mere conscientious objectors-but the
trial court refused to permit them to raise such a defense to the
jury." After they were convicted and sentenced, neither
appealed. Within a matter of days after the time for filing a
direct appeal had expired, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Smith v. United States9 and Estep v. United States,' which
24. Id. at 468.
25. U.S. v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982).
26. 523 U.S. at 622-23 (citing Engle, 456 U.S. 107).
27. 332 U.S. 174 (1947).
28. Id. at 175-76.
29. 325 U.S. 846 (1945) (granting certiorari).
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were consolidated, and ultimately held that defendants charged
with draft evasion could defend against such charges by
challenging the correctness of their selective service
classifications so long as they first had exhausted their
administrative remedies within the Selective Service System."
Sunal and Kulick, who had exhausted their administrative
remedies before trial, filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus,
which challenged their convictions under Estep 2
A threshold issue in Sunal was whether the two defendants'
failure to have raised their claim on direct appeal foreclosed
habeas corpus relief on procedural grounds. Disagreeing with
both the Second Circuit (in Kulick's case) and the Fourth Circuit
(in Sunal's case), the Supreme Court held that the defendants'
failure to raise the issue on direct appeal foreclosed their ability
to do so on collateral review.33 At the time of their decision not
to file a direct appeal in 1945, precedent from all eight of the
United State Courts of Appeals to have addressed the issue,
including the Second and Fourth Circuits, had rejected precisely
the defense that Sunal and Kulick had attempted to raise at their
trials, and the Supreme Court recently had denied certiorari in
one of those other cases.34 More significant, at that time, extant
Supreme Court precedent, Falbo v. United States,35 certainly
appeared, from an objective standpoint, to directly foreclose the
claim." As the Fourth Circuit observed in Sunal's case,37 the
Court's decision in Falbo "was very widely understood by the
Bench and Bar" to foreclose the claim and that, indeed, it
30. 326 U.S. 703 (1945) (granting certiorari); see also Sunal, 332 U.S. at 176-77, n. 2
(discussing the timing of Sunal and Kulick's cases and the grants of certiorari in Smith and
Estep).
31. EstepvU.S.,327 U.S. 114 (1946).
32. Sunal, 332 U.S. at 176-77.
33. Id. at 183-84.
34. See e.g. Estep, 327 U.S. at 139; Sunal v. Large, 157 F.2d 165, 176, n 7 (4th Cir.
1947).
35. 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
36. In Falbo, the Court addressed the question of "whether Congress has authorized
judicial review of the propriety of a board's classification in a criminal prosecution for
willful violation of an order directing the registrant to report for the last step in the
selective process." Id. at 554. The Court in Falbo held that Congress had not authorized
such judicial review of the selective service classification in a subsequent draft evasion
case. Id.
37. Sunal v. Large, 157 F.2d 165.
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appeared that the trial court in Sunal's case had rejected the
claim "on the supposed authority of the Falbo case."3 The
Second Circuit, in Kulick's case, in an opinion by Judge
Learned Hand, 9 stated that there had been "an unusual
consensus of judicial opinion against" the claim prior to Estep
and that "there had not been any glimmer of a positive chance
of success" at the time that Kulick failed to file a direct appeal.40
Notwithstanding the solid wall of lower court precedent
against the claim and the apparent preclusive effect of Falbo
(prior to the Court's decision in Estep), the Supreme Court in
Sunal held that the defendants' failure to file a direct appeal
raising the apparently foreclosed issue waived their right to
federal habeas review. A majority of the Court, over the
dissenting opinion of two Justices,4 stated "we do not think that
they should now be allowed to justify their failure [to file a
direct appeal] by saying they deemed any appeal futile."42
The Sunal Court discounted the significance of the apparent
precedential effect of Falbo at the time that Sunal and Kulick's
right to file a timely direct appeal had expired, explaining that
Falbo only applied to situations where a defendant (like Falbo)
charged with draft evasion had not exhausted his administrative
remedies and thus first challenged the propriety of his
classification in a subsequent criminal prosecution for draft
evasion. 43 Although such a distinction between a case like Falbo
and a case like Estep was palpable to a majority of the Court in
38. Id. at 168-69.
39. U.S. ex rel. Kulick v. Kennedy, 157 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1946).
40. Id. at 813-14.
41. See Sunal, 332 U.S. at 191 (Rutledge & Murphy, JJ., dissenting) (contending that
"good reason existed" to excuse the defendants' failure to file a direct appeal). The
dissenters contended that:
Whether or not the inferior courts were justified in taking the Falbo decision for
more than its specific ruling [i.e., refusing to permit the defendant to collaterally
challenge his selective-service classification in a criminal prosecution when he
had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies], the fact remains that their
broadly prevailing view was that [Falbo] had cut off all right to make such
defenses as Sunal and Kulick tendered .... In that prevailing climate of opinion
in those courts, there was hardly any chance that an appeal to the federal circuit
court of appeals would bring any relief by their action.
Id. at 191-92.
42. Id. at 181.
43. Id. at 176-77.
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Estep (and later in Sunal),44 it was by no means clear to the
bench and bar prior to the Court's articulation of such a
distinction in Estep.45 Indeed, in his concurring opinion in Estep,
Justice Frankfurter pointed to the pre-Estep consensus, noting
that "more than forty judges in the circuit courts of appeals"
had interpreted Falbo to prevent a defendant in a draft evasion
prosecution from challenging the validity of his classification at• 41
trial even if he had first exhausted his administrative remedies.
"Such was the impact of this Court's reasoning in the Falbo
case," Justice Frankfurter noted.47
Sunal's unforgiving approach to futility was rarely
mentioned by either the Supreme Court or the lower courts in
the two decades that followed.48 However, in 1966, Sunal's
precedential value was called into question, at least implicitly,
by the Supreme Court's unanimous per curiam decision 49 in
O'Connor v. Ohio,5° which took a different tack regarding
futility than the Court had taken in Sunal. In O'Connor's state
court jury trial on larceny charges, the prosecutor, without
objection from the defense, negatively commented on the
defendant's invocation of his right to silence. On appeal to an
44. Arguably, the distinction articulated in Estep was not a function of careful legal
analysis but, instead, was a function of the fact that Falbo was decided while World War II
was raging in early 1944 and Estep was decided in February of 1946, many months after
the war had ended and after the fear of draft disruption had abided. Cf Falbo, 320 U.S. at
559-60 (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he effective prosecution of the war in no way
demands that petitioner be denied a full hearing of this case.").
45. See Sunal, 157 F.2d at 168; see also U.S. v. Rinko, 147 F.2d 1, 2 (7th Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 851 (1945) (in a pre-Estep appeal where the defendant had
exhausted his administrative remedies, the Seventh Circuit stated: "It is clear from the
Falbo decision .... that the defendant was precluded from contesting [his classification] in
defense to the indictment."). In a post-Estep decision, the Fifth Circuit stated that Estep
had "modified" Falbo. Wells v. U.S., 158 F.2d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1946). This
characterization is correct, insofar as the Court's decision in Falbo did not draw any
distinction between a draftee's exhaustion of his administrative remedies and a draftee's
non-exhaustion in terms of his ability to subsequently raise the issue in a criminal
prosecution for draft evasion.
46. Estep, 327 U.S. at 137-39 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing cases).
47. Id. at 139.
48. See e.g. Gaitan v. U.S., 317 F.2d 494, 498 (10th Cir. 1963) (citing Sunal with
approval).
49. "The Court .... has at times said [a per curiam, summary decision] does not have
the same precedential [value] as does a case decided upon full briefing and argument."
Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 651 n. 1 (1987).
50. 385 U.S. at 93.
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intermediate appellate court and Ohio's supreme court,
O'Connor likewise never voiced objection to the prosecutor's
comments during the trial. After the state appellate process was
completed and while O'Connor's certiorari petition was
pending, the Court decided Griffin v. California,5 in which the
Court first held that a prosecutor's comments on a defendant's
invocation of his right to silence during trial violated the Fifth
Amendment. After Griffin, the United States Supreme Court
vacated the Ohio Supreme Court's judgment in O'Connor's case
and remanded for reconsideration in light of the intervening
decision in Griffin.52
On remand, the Ohio Supreme Court, citing, inter alia, the
Supreme Court's decision in Sunal, procedurally defaulted
O'Connor's Fifth Amendment claim raised under Griffin on the
ground that he had failed to make that objection during the
trial.53 O'Connor then filed a second certiorari petition with the
United States Supreme Court raising the Fifth Amendment
claim. The State of Ohio responded to his petition by invoking
the Ohio Supreme Court's procedural default ruling as an
independent and adequate state law ground precluding review of
the merits of O'Connor's federal constitutional claim. The
United States Supreme Court disagreed with the state, holding
that, in view of a "practice which Ohio had long allowed" under
firmly entrenched Ohio law54 that permitted prosecutors to
comment on the accused's silence at trial, O'Connor's "failure
to object .... cannot strip him of his right to attack the practice
following its invalidation by this Court." 5 The Court agreed
with the dissenting justices on the Ohio Supreme Court who had
contended that "it would not have served any legitimate state
interest or sound public purpose" in requiring an objection-in
contradiction of entrenched state appellate precedent-prior to
Griffin.56
51. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
52. O'Connor v. Ohio, 382 U.S. 286 (1965) (per curiam).
53. State v. O'Connor, 217 N.E.2d 685, 689 (Ohio 1966) (citing Sunal).
54. O'Connor, 385 U.S. at 93; see also O'Connor, 217 N.E.2d at 690-93 (O'Neill,
Herbert & Brown JJ., dissenting) (noting that, prior to Griffin, both case law of the Ohio
Supreme Court and Ohio Constitution an. I, § 10 permitted prosecutors to comment on a
criminal defendant's invocation of his right to silence at trial).
55. 385 U.S. at 93.
56. O'Connor, 217 N.E.2d at 693 (O'Neill, J., dissenting).
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In a subsequent case, the United States Supreme Court
cited its decision in O'Connor for the proposition that the Ohio
Supreme Court's application of its contemporaneous objection
rule, as applied to the futility scenario in O'Connor's case, was
an "inadequate state law ground."57 In the wake of O'Connor,
lower courts followed its holding that the futility of raising a
claim based on extant state appellate precedent excused a
procedural default. 8
The Court's holding in O'Connor was consistent with its
analogous decision the year before in Douglas v. Alabama.59 In
Douglas, the state trial court explicitly overruled the defendant's
objections to the prosecution's admission of a non-testifying
codefendant's out-of-court confession on Confrontation Clause
grounds. On a subsequent occasion during .the trial, when the
prosecution actually read the codefendant's confession to the
jury, the defendant did not re-urge his objection. On appeal, the
state appellate court ruled that the defendant's failure to object
on the subsequent occasion procedurally defaulted his
Confrontation Clause claim.6° The United States Supreme Court
disagreed, holding that the state appellate court's procedural
default ruling was not an "adequate" state law ground that
deprived the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over the
constitutional claim. 6' The Court reasoned that "[n]o legitimate
state interest would have been served by requiring repetition of a
patently futile objection, already thrice rejected . , 62
Douglas's logic applies equally to the situation when an
objection made in an inferior court would have been "patently
futile" in light of binding appellate precedent that would have
preordained an adverse ruling from the inferior court.
57. Cardinale v. La., 394 U.S. 437, 439 (1969).
58. See e.g. Doby v. Beto, 371 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1967); Wyley v. Warden, 372
F.2d 742, 743 n. I (4th Cir. 1967), overruled on other grounds; Jenkins v. Hutchinson, 221
F.3d 679, 685 (4th Cir. 2000).
59. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
60. Id. at 420-22.
61. Id. at 422-23.
62. Id. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Douglas in a subsequent case
presenting a similar procedural default issue. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 124-25
(1990) (finding an inadequate state law ground in a case with a similar sequence of events
in the trial court).
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Towards the end of the 1960s, the Court issued two
decisions that bolstered its per curiam decision in O'Connor and
further signaled a retreat from Sunal. In Grosso v. United
States,63 and Leary v. United States,64 the Court forgave the
defendants' failure to assert, in a timely manner, First
Amendment challenges to their convictions for willfully failing
to pay federal taxes in connection with their illegal activities
(gambling in Grosso and drugs in Leary).65 The Court observed
that the First Amendment claim was viable only after the
Supreme Court's decision in Marchetti v. United States,66 which
was decided following the defendants' trials, and "given the
[prior] decisions of this Court in [United States v. Kahriger67and
Lewis v. United States68], which were on the books at the time of
petitioner's trial [and only overruled later in Marchetti], we are
unable to view his failure to present this issue as an effective
waiver" of his First Amendment claim. 69 Writing for the en banc
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in United States v. Byers,7 ° then-Judge Scalia cited
Grosso and Leary for the proposition that the futility of
objecting based on then-binding appellate precedent excuses a
procedural default, while rejecting the claim on the merits."
In Hankerson v. North Carolina,72 albeit only in dicta in a
footnote, the Supreme Court appeared abruptly to abandon its
forgiving position regarding futility in O'Connor, Grosso, and
Leary, and to return to its unforgiving position in Sunal. The
63. 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
64. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
65. Leary, 395 U.S. at 27; Grosso, 390 U.S. at 63.
66. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
67. 345 U.S. 22, 32-33 (1953).
68. 348 U.S. 419 (1955).
69. Grosso, 390 U.S. at 70-71 (also noting Fifth Circuit's rejection of a similar
challenge to federal gambling statute in Haynes v. U.S., 339 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1964));
accord Leary, 395 U.S. at 27-28 (citing Grosso).
70. 740 F.2d 1104, 1109 n. 6 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
71. The issue split the court. Judge Robinson, joined by Judge Wright, concurred in the
judgment only, finding the issue procedurally defaulted and barred from review Id. at 1133
n. 52, 1137-38 (Robinson & Wright, JJ., concurring in the judgment). Judge Bazelon,
writing for the dissenting judges, argued for the applicability of the futility exception and
would have voted to reverse the petitioner's conviction. Id. at 1161 n. 138 (Bazelon, Wald,
Mikva & Edwards, JJ., dissenting).
72. 432 U.S. 233 (1977).
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Hankerson Court held that its decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur 3
was retroactively applicable to cases in which the trials occurred
before Mullaney. 74 In dismissing the state's argument that such a
retroactive application of the "new rule" of law announced in
Mullaney (which overruled numerous state courts' precedents)
would have "devastating" effect on the "administration of
justice" around the country by requiring countless retrials, the
Court stated in footnote eight:
[W]e are not persuaded that the impact on the
administration of justice in those States that utilize the sort
of burden-shifting presumptions involved in this case will
be as devastating as respondent asserts. If the validity of
such burden-shifting presumptions [was] as well settled in
the States that have them as respondent asserts, then it is
unlikely that prior to Mullaney many defense lawyers made
appropriate objections .... The States, if they wish, may be
able to insulate past convictions by enforcing the normal
and valid rule that failure to object [at trial] is a waiver of
any claim of error."
Despite the fact that footnote eight was dicta (insofar as
procedural default was not at issue in Hankerson), and despite
the fact that it flatly contradicted the earlier holding of the Court
in O'Connor, numerous lower federal courts followed the
footnote in refusing to find that the futility of objecting in the
state courts based on extant, adverse state appellate precedent
(overruled by a supervening decision of the Supreme Court)
excused a procedural default.
7 6
73. 421 U.S. 684, 702-04 (1975) (holding that the prosecution has the burden to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of self-defense in a jurisdiction that has treated such
a fact as an "element" of the offense).
74. Hankerson, 432 U.S. at 241-244.
75. Id. at 244 n. 8. Although more obliquely, the Court intimated the same thing in
dicta in a footnote in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 n. 9 (1961) ("As is always the
case ..... state procedural requirements governing assertion and pursuance of direct and
collateral constitutional challenges to criminal prosecutions must be respected.").
76. E.g. Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055, 1062-63 (4th Cir. 1980); Breest v. Perrin,
495 F. Supp. 287, 292-93 (D.N.H. 1980); see also U.S. ex rel. Maxey v. Morris, 591 F.2d
386, 391 (7th Cir. 1979) (refusing to excuse a procedural default in state court based on
futility of objecting based on extant state appellate precedent, although not citing
Hankerson's footnote eight).
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In 1981, in Estelle v. Smith,77 the Court, in a footnote,
affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision that a state defendant's
failure to raise a claim at his trial did not procedurally default
the claim on federal habeas corpus review "for the reasons
stated by the Court of Appeals." 78 The Fifth Circuit had refused
to apply the procedural default doctrine to the claim for three
alternative reasons, one of which was "the alleged futility of
objecting" based on prior directly adverse decisions of the
highest state appellate court at the time of the trial.79 In support
of its holding regarding futility, the Fifth Circuit cited its prior
decision in Rummel v. Estelle,8 ° in which the en banc court had
held that "[s]ince it is apparent that the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals ha[d] repeatedly rejected Rummel-like [claims], we are
at a loss to see how any state interest would be served by
demanding that Rummel make a futile gesture at his trial." 8 In
the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Smith, lower courts
interpreted its footnote twelve as standing for the proposition
that the procedural default doctrine does not apply when an
objection in the trial court would have been futile under extant
appellate precedent."
The very next year, the Court again addressed the futility
issue in Engle v. Isaac,8' a federal habeas corpus case in whichthe defendant claimed that the jury instructions at his state trial
77. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
78. Id. at 468 n. 12 (citing Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694, 708 n. 19 (5th Cir. 1979)).
79. Smith, 602 F.2d at 708 n. 19.
80. 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), aff'd, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
81. Id. at 653. Such reasoning-that no legitimate state interest would be served by
applying the procedural default doctrine when an objection would have been entirely
futile-is persuasive and fully consistent with other Supreme Court authority. See e.g. Lee
v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 378 (2002) (holding that a state procedural default rule that does
not serve any legitimate state interest should not be applied on federal habeas corpus
review).
The Supreme Court, which later granted certiorari in Rummel, did not reject or
endorse this particular holding by the Fifth Circuit in Rummel and, instead, affirmed on the
alternate basis (also articulated by the Fifth Circuit) that, under Texas procedural law, a
contemporaneous objection was not required to preserve a facial constitutional challenge to
a statute (the type of challenge made by Rummel). Rummel, 445 U.S. at 267 n. 7.
82. See e.g. Guam v. Yang, 850 F.2d 507, 512 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Smith's
footnote 12) (en banc), overruled by U.S. v. Keys, 133 F.3d 1282, 1287 (9th Cir. 1998) (en
banc); U.S. v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1109 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (addressing
preservation issue).
83. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
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had unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to him
regarding the issue of self-defense. Isaac had not objected to the
instructions at his 1975 trial and, when he raised the claim for
the first time on appeal, the Ohio appellate courts refused to
address the merits of the claim and, instead, found it
procedurally defaulted.14 Isaac proceeded to file a federal habeas
corpus petition challenging the jury instructions under Mullaney
v. Wilbur,85 but the federal district court "determined that Isaac
had waived any constitutional claims [about the jury
instructions] by failing to present them to the Ohio trial court."86
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that his
failure to comply with Ohio's contemporaneous objection rule at
trial was an inadequate ground on which to foreclose habeas
corpus relief. Citing O'Connor, the Sixth Circuit stated that,
based on "well-established law" in Ohio at the time of Isaac's
trial, "it would have seemed futile for Isaac to object to a jury
instruction allocating to the defendant the burden of proving
self-defense."87 The court concluded that "[a] defendant cannot
be expected to predict a change in the interpretation of state law
when the law is so well-established and there has been no hint of
a change in that law." 88
A majority of the United States Supreme Court in Engle, in
an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, disagreed with the en
banc Sixth Circuit and held that Isaac's procedural default under
Ohio's contemporaneous objection rule-his failure to raise the
issue at trial-foreclosed federal habeas corpus relief.8 9 The
Court held that "the futility of presenting an objection to the
state courts cannot alone constitute cause for failure to object at
trial."90 The Court reasoned that if a defendant "perceives a
constitutional claim and believes it might find favor in the
federal courts, he may not bypass the state courts simply
84. Id. at 115-16.
85. 421 U.S. 684.
86. Engle, 456 U.S. at 117-18.
87. Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129, 1133 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
88. Id. (citing 385 U.S. 92). Rather than rely on the Supreme Court's decision in
O'Connor, the dissenting Sixth Circuit judges cited the dicta in footnote eight in
Hankerson, 432 U.S. at 244. See Isaac, 646 F.2d at 1140-41 (Merritt & Kennedy, JJ.,
dissenting.).
89. Engle, 456 U.S. at 130-35.
90. Id. at 130.
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because he thinks they will be unsympathetic to the claim," for
"[e]ven a state court that has previously rejected a constitutional
argument may decide, upon reflection, that the contention is
valid," and " [a]llowing criminal defendants to deprive the state
courts of this opportunity would contradict the principles" of
federalism and comity that animate the Court's modem federal
habeas corpus jurisprudence.9 ' The Court reasoned that
federalism requires that a "trial court [must have] the
opportunity to correct the defect and avoid problematic retrials"
and also that "state appellate courts [must have the] chance to
mend their own fences and avoid federal intrusion."92 Notably,
the Court in Engle cited the footnote in Hankerson with
approval but failed to cite the Court's prior inconsistent
decisions in O'Connor or Smith regarding the futility of
objecting as excusing a procedural default.93
Two years after Engle, in Reed v. Ross94 a reconfigured
majority of the Court led by Justice Brennan and joined by the
three other dissenters in Engle,' appeared to breathe some life
back into the futility exception, albeit in a passage that was
mostly dicta. In Reed, the Court addressed whether the
"novelty" of a particular claim at the time of a defendant's
failure to assert it constitutes "cause" under the Sykes standard.96
The Reed Court held that the" novelty" of a claim-defined as a
claim with "no reasonable basis in existing law" --did constitute
cause.97 In discussing the meaning of the term "novelty," the
majority in Reed, without mentioning the concept of "futility,"
91. Id. (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72). The Court found support for its
holding in the concurring opinion of Justice Powell in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501,
515 (1976) (trial counsel's belief that an objection would be "futile" is not a basis to
excuse a procedural default), and Judge Poole's dissenting opinion in Myers v. Washington,
646 F.2d 355, 364 (9th Cir. 1981) (Poole, J., dissenting) (futility cannot constitute cause if
it means simply that a claim was "unacceptable to that particular court at that particular
time"), vacated and remanded, 456 U.S. 921 (1982). See Engle, 456 U.S. at 130 n.35.
92. Id. at 128-29.
93. Id. at 134 n. 43 (citing Hankerson, 432 U.S. at 244 n. 8).
94. 468 U.S. 1 (1984).
95. In Reed, three of the four dissenting Justices--Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Rehnquist and O'Connor-had been in the majority in Engle. ld.. at 21. The fourth
dissenter in Reed, Justice Blackmun, concurred in the result in Engle. See Engle, 456 U.S.
at 135.
96. 468 U.S. at 13.
97. Id. at 15-16.
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obviously had it in mind:
Although the question whether an attorney has a
"reasonable basis" upon which to develop a legal theory
may arise in a variety of contexts, we confine our attention
to the specific situation presented here: one in which this
Court has articulated a constitutional principle that had not
been previously recognized but which is held to have
retroactive application. In United States v. Johnson, 457
U.S. 537, 102 S.Ct. 2579, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982), we
identified three situations in which a "new" constitutional
rule, representing "'a clear break with the past,"' might
emerge from this Court. Id., at 549, 102 S.Ct. at 2587
(quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258-259, 89
S.Ct. 1030, 1038-1039, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969)). First, a
decision of this Court may explicitly overrule one of our
precedents. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S., at 551, 102
S.Ct., at 2588. Second, a decision may "overtur[n] a
longstanding and widespread practice to which this Court
has not spoken, but which a near-unanimous body of lower
court authority has expressly approved." Ibid. And, finally,
a decision may "disapprov[e] a practice this Court arguably
has sanctioned in prior cases." Ibid. By definition, when a
case falling into one of the first two categories is given
retroactive application, there will almost certainly have
been no reasonable basis upon which an attorney
previously could have urged a state court to adopt the
position that this Court has ultimately adopted.
Consequently, the failure of a defendant's attorney to have
pressed such a claim before a state court is sufficiently
excusable to satisfy the cause requirement. Cases falling
into the third category, however, present a more difficult
question. Whether an attorney had a reasonable basis for
pressing a claim challenging a practice that this Court has
arguably sanctioned depends on how direct this Court's
sanction of the prevailing practice had been, how well
entrenched the practice was in the relevant jurisdiction at
the time of defense counsel's failure to challenge it, and
how strong the available support is from sources opposing• • • 98
the prevailing practice.
Although the Court here purported to discuss the "novelty"
concept, clearly all three of the scenarios mentioned-(1) the
98. Id. at 17-18.
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Court's overruling one of its prior precedents directly on point;
(2) the Court's disapproval of a "longstanding and widespread"
consensus or near-consensus on an issue by lower appellate
courts where the Court previously had not addressed the issue,
and (3) the Court's reversal of an implicit position it had taken
in prior cases-are ones in which, prior to the action of the
Supreme Court, it would have been futile for a defendant to have
raised the claim in the lower courts. 99
Two years after Reed was decided, the Supreme Court, in
Smith v. Murray, '°° discussed both Reed and Engle in its
treatment of the habeas corpus petitioner's procedural default.
However, Smith did not resolve the apparent tension between the
two cases because Smith did not involve any of the three
scenarios of novelty/futility mentioned in Reed. Rather, Smith
involved a claim that, at the time of the defendant's failure to
raise it, had never been addressed in any manner by the United
States Supreme Court and about which there was no consensus
or near consensus among the lower appellate courts. ,0
In addressing Reed, which it distinguished, the Smith Court
held that a claim is not "novel" if "at the time of the default the
claim was 'available' at all" under extant precedent. 2 In
Smith's case, although the state supreme court previously had
rendered a decision in another case prior to Smith's trial that
foreclosed his claim of error, the Supreme Court noted that
"various forms of the claim he now advances had been
percolating in [other] lower courts [around the country] for years
at the time of his original appeal" when he failed to raise the
claim. ' 3 Therefore, his claim was not considered "novel." ' '
With respect to the futility issue, the Supreme Court held that,
99. Lower courts have questioned the continuing "vitality" of this dicta in Reed in light
of Bousley, 523 U.S. 614; see e.g. U.S. v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 1002 (8th Cir. 2001).
100. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
101. Smith involved a Fifth Amendment claim under Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454
(1981), based on the admission of a prosecution psychiatrist's testimony at the capital
sentencing hearing. 477 U.S. at 530. At the time of Smith's direct appeal to the Virginia
Supreme Court in 1978, Smith v. Cmnw., 248 S.E.2d 135 150 (Va. 1978), that court
previously had rejected the claim but, as noted by the court, other courts around the country
had found merit in the claim. See Gibson v. Cmmw., 219 S.E.2d 845, 847 (Va. 1975)
(noting that "the authorities are divided" on the Fifth Amendment issue).
102. Smith, 477 U.S. at 537.
103. Id. at 534, 537; see also id. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 537.
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because Smith did not raise the issue on appeal to the state
supreme court and urge that court to reconsider its prior, adverse
decision, he could not show cause for his procedural default,
notwithstanding the fact that he "had little chance of success in
the [state supreme court]." ,0 Citing Engle, the Court reasoned:
"I[I]t is the very prospect that a state court 'may decide, upon
reflection, that the [claim] is valid' that undergirds the
established rule that 'perceived futility alone cannot constitute
cause.. . .' for 'allowing criminal defendants to deprive the
state courts of [the] opportunity' to reconsider previously
rejected constitutional claims is fundamentally at odds with the
principles of comity that animate Sykes and its progeny."' 06
Any life left in the futility exception (even if clothed in the
"novelty" rubric) appeared extinguished in a series of decisions
by the Supreme Court in the 1990s. The issue was first raised in
United States v. France, in which the judgment of the Ninth
Circuit was affirmed by an equally divided Court. ' 7 In France,
the Ninth Circuit held that the procedural default doctrine was
inapplicable because France's objection in the trial court would
have been futile as a result of "a 'solid wall of [Ninth] [C]ircuit
authority' which would have prevented the district court from
correcting the alleged error." '0 After France's trial, the Supreme
Court overruled the Ninth Circuit precedent that previously had
foreclosed the claim that France ultimately raised for the first
time on direct appeal. After the Supreme Court granted the
government's certiorari petition, the parties predictably took
diverse positions on the futility issue, each side citing Supreme
Court precedent that supported its position.' ° The Justices,
105. Id. at 534.
106. Id. at 535.
107. 498 U.S. 335 (1991) (per curiam). Justice Souter did not participate. Id.
108. 886 F.2d 223, 228 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Objecting in the trial court to a clearly defined
rule of the circuit [court] is futile, inasmuch as the trial court cannot overrule authority
binding on it.").
109. Compare Brief of U.S., U.S. v. France, 498 U.S. 335, 1990 WL 508089, at *27
(contending that futility is not an exception to the procedural default doctrine; citing Engle
v. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 130), with Brief of Respt., U.S. v. France, 498 U.S. 335, 1990 WL
508088, at **I 1-16 (contending that procedural default is inapplicable when an objection
at trial would have been futile under extant appellant precedent, citing e.g. Estelle v. Smith,
451 U.S 454, and Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1).
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whose votes were evenly divided, did not resolve the futility
issue in France."0
In 1997, in Johnson v. United States,"' the Court addressed
the issue left unresolved in France and held that the procedural
default doctrine in federal direct appeals-that is, the "plain
error" standard'-applied to a claim raised for the first time on
appeal even if it would have been utterly futile to have objected
in the district court in view of then-governing appellate
precedent. At the time of Johnson's trial, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, whose precedent governed
the federal district court in Johnson, had held that the
"materiality" of an allegedly perjurious statement in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1623 was not an "element" of the offense that had
to be decided by the jury, as opposed to the trial court."3 Only
after Johnson's trial, in United States v. Gaudin,114 did the United
States Supreme Court overrule the Eleventh Circuit's precedent.
On direct appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, Johnson raised the
claim that the district court's instructed verdict on materiality
was constitutional error. That court held that the claim was
procedurally defaulted and, under the plain error standard,
Johnson could not establish sufficient prejudice and convince
the appellate court to exercise its discretion to reverse her
conviction. 115
In her brief filed with the Supreme Court, Johnson
contended that the restrictive plain error standard should be
inapplicable to a claim that would have been entirely foreclosed
by "a solid wall of binding" appellate precedent at the time of
the trial court proceedings. "6 The Supreme Court held that
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b)"7 "by its terms"
110. An affirmance by an equally-divided Court is not an expression of approval of the
lower court's judgment and, thus, has no precedential value. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188,
192 (1972).
111. 520 U.S. 461,464-66 (1997).
112. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (2002).
113. See e.g. U.S. v. Molinares, 700 F.2d 647, 653 (1 1th Cir. 1983).
114. 515 U.S. 506, 522-23 (1995) (holding that "materiality" of a false statement was
an "element" of the offense that must be submitted to the jury at a trial).
115. U.S. v. Johnson, 82 F.3d 429 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
116. Brief of Pet., U.S. v. Johnson, 520 U.S. 461, 1996 WL 741434, at **25-29.
117. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) provides: "Plain Error. A plain error that
affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the trial
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applied to all claims raised for the first time on federal direct
appeals and, because Johnson did not raise her claim in the
district court, the plain error standard applied on appeal,
notwithstanding the "solid wall" of Eleventh Circuit precedent
that foreclosed the objection at the time of her trial."8 The Court
opined that Rule 52(b) was based on "careful balancing" of the
"need to encourage all trial participants to seek a fair trial" with
the Court's "insistence that obvious injustice be promptly
addressed."" 9 The Court claimed to "have no authority" to
make any exceptions to Rule 52(b). 2 °
The next year, in Bousley v. United States,2' the Court dealt
with a futility scenario similar to the one first addressed fifty
years earlier in Sunal. In Bousley, the defendant was charged
with violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), which outlawed the "use"
of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense.
At the time he was convicted in 1990, then-governing appellate
precedent of the Eighth Circuit provided that a defendant "uses"
a firearm during and in relation to a drug offense so long as the
firearm was in "close proximity" and had some "nexus" to
illegal drugs, even if the defendant did not "actively employ"
the firearm.'22 In light of such entrenched precedent, Bousley did
not attack his conviction on this ground in either the trial court
or on his direct appeal to the Eighth Circuit, which occurred
1991. After the Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Bailey v.
United States,'23 which overruled Eighth Circuit precedent by
holding that "use" under § 924(c)(1) requires "active
employment" of a firearm, Bousley contended for the first time
in a collateral attack of his conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255 that his conviction was invalid under Bailey.
court's attention." The rule was intended to be "a restatement of existing [case] law" at the
time of its promulgation in 1944. See id., Advisory Comm. Notes, 1944 Adoption, Note to
Subdivision (b).
118. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 466.
119. Id.
120. Id. Whether the Court has such authority is discussed in notes 158 through 165,
infra, and the accompanying text.
121. 523 U.S. 614.
122. See e.g. U.S. v. Lyman, 892 F.2d 751, 753-54 n.4 (8th Cir. 1989); U.S. v. Townley,
929 F.2d 365, 368-69 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing cases).
123. 516 U.S. 137. 146-50 (1995).
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The Supreme Court held that Bousley had procedurally
defaulted his claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal, thus
subjecting the claim to Sykes's "cause and prejudice" test.'24 In
response to Bousley's argument that raising the claim in his
appeal to the Eighth Circuit (which occurred in 1991, four years
before Bailey was decided) would have been futile under
entrenched Eighth Circuit precedent, the Supreme Court, citing
Engle, held that his argument was "unavailing" because
"'futility cannot constitute cause if it means simply that a claim
was unacceptable to that particular court at that particular
time.'" 125
Thus, in Johnson and Bousley, the Supreme Court found it
irrelevant that governing appellate case law foreclosed the
defendants' claims at the time of their procedural defaults. In so
holding, the Court overruled a tremendous amount of lower
court precedent, in both the direct appeal and collateral review
contexts, which had held that a "solid wall" of appellate
precedent (of the governing state supreme court, governing
federal circuit court, or the United States Supreme Court) at the
time of a defendant's lack of objection excused the procedural
default.'26 Since Bousley and Johnson, the lower federal courts
have refused to recognize any type of futility exception to the
procedural default doctrine, even when there was binding
Supreme Court precedent (later overruled or cast into serious
doubt by a subsequent decision of the Court) that would have
squarely foreclosed an objection at the time of the defendant's
failure to object.'27 A few dissenting judges on the lower federal
124. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621-22.
125. Id. at 623 (quoting Engle, 456 U.S. at 130 n. 35).
126. See e.g. U.S. v. Turman, 104 F.3d 1191, 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 1997); Waldemer v.
U.S., 106 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1996); U.S. v. Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 1139-40 (D.C.
Cir. 1994); U.S. v. Martinez, 912 F.2d 1552, 1554-55 (1st Cir. 1990) (en bane; majority
opinion joined by Breyer, C.J.); U.S. v. France, 886 F.2d 223, 227-28 (9th Cir. 1989), aff'd
by an equally divided court, 498 U.S. 335 (1991); Callanan v. U.S., 881 F.2d 229, 231 (6th
Cir. 1989); Bateman v. U.S., 875 F.2d 1304, 1307-08 (7th Cir. 1989); Dalton v. U.S., 862
F.2d 1307, 1310 (8th Cir. 1988); Guam v. Yang, 850 F.2d 507, 512 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1988) (en
banc); U.S. v. Shelton, 848 F.2d 1485, 1490 (10th Cir. 1988); U.S. v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104,
1109 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Scalia, J.); Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651, 653 (5th
Cir. 1978) (en banc); U.S. v. Scott, 425 F.2d 55, 57-58 (9th Cir. 1970) (en bane).
127. See e.g. U.S. v. Aparco-Centeno, 280 F.3d 1084, 1087-90 (6th Cir. 2002)
(subjecting defendant's claim based on Apprendi v. N.J., 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which was
decided while the defendant's appeal was pending, to "plain error" review, even though at
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courts, however, have contended that there may be some life left
in the futility exception, at least in certain circumstances. '28
These judges have reasoned that, at least in the collateral review
context, the futility exception exists even after Bousley in
circumstances where legal arguments were not simply
foreclosed under the precedent of a particular lower appellate
court but were "more generally unacceptable" in courts
throughout the country.2 9 Although Johnson and Bousley have
appeared to have nailed the coffin shut on futility as an
exception to the procedural default doctrine in the federal courts,
a futility exception still exists in many states.13
IV. A COMMON-SENSE PROPOSAL FOR AN ACTUAL FUTILITY
EXCEPTION TO THE PROCEDURAL DEFAULT DOCTRINE
As the foregoing analysis of the Supreme Court's varied
treatment of the futility exception during the past six decades
demonstrates, there has been little, if any, consistently applied
logic in this area of the Court's error preservation jurisprudence.
Common sense-which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
the time of the district court proceedings, the issue was foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v.
U.S., 523 U.S. 224 (1998)); U.S. v. Terry, 240 F.3d 65, 72-73 (1st Cir. 2001) (same); U.S.
v. Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F.3d 411, 413-14 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); McCoy v. U.S., 266 F.3d
1245, 1258-59 (11 th Cir. 2001) ("The fact that every circuit which had addressed the issue
[raised by the defendant] had rejected [the defendant's claim] .... simply demonstrates
that reasonable defendants and lawyers could well have concluded that it would be futile to
raise the issue. The problem with this position is that the Supreme Court could not have
been clearer that futility does not constitute cause to excuse a procedural default."); U.S. v.
Moss, 252 F.3d at 1002 (8th Cir. 2001) (same); U.S. v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 145 (4th Cir.
2001) (same); U.S. v. Smith, 241 F.3d 546, 548 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[E]ven when the law is
against a contention, a litigant must make the argument to preserve it for later
consideration." ).
128. McCoy, 266 F.3d at 1272-74 (Barkett, J., concurring in result); Moss, 252 F.3d at
1005-06 (Richard S. Arnold, J., dissenting); U.S. v. Smith, 250 F.3d 1073, 1073-77 (7th
Cir. 2001) (Wood, Rovner & Williams, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
129. Smith, 250 F.3d at 1075-76 (Wood, J., dissenting); see also McCoy, 266 F.3d at
1274 (Barkett, J., concurring in result only).
130. See e.g. Black v. State, 816 S.W.2d 350, 364-65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); People v.
Clark, 789 P.2d 127, 154-55 n.33 (Cal. 1990); State v. Goodyear, 413 P.2d 566, 567-68
(Ariz. 1966); Cmmw. v. Guerro, 207 N.E.2d 887, 889-90 (Mass. 1965). If a state court fails
to follow its own futility exception in finding a state defendant's federal constitutional
claim in procedural default, such a procedural default ruling would not be "adequate" if
invoked in subsequent federal court proceedings. See Miller v. N.C., 583 F.2d 701, 704-06
(4th Cir. 1978); cf County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 150-51 (1979).
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O'Connor, the leading proponents of abolishing the futility
exception,' have recognized as being a relevant considerationin th procdura defest the32C
in the procedural default context "-requires the Court to
recognize that, at least in some situations, the futility of
objecting should excuse a defendant's procedural default.
Simply put, if at the time of the procedural default, the law of a
superior court that governed the inferior court before which the
defendant appeared unquestionably would have foreclosed a
particular legal claim, then it makes absolutely no sense in law
or logic to subject the claim to any type of restrictive review on
direct appeal (i.e., the plain error standard) on or collateral
review (i.e., the cause-and-prejudice standard).
In our common law system, it is axiomatic that an inferior
court must follow the precedent of a superior court until it is
overruled by the latter, even if appellate decisions in analogous
contexts appear to undercut the validity of such precedent.'33
With respect to federal law issues, the Supremacy Clause 3 4 and
the hierarchical structure of Article III of the Constitution, which
speaks of the Supreme Court and "inferior" federal courts,
131. Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinions in Bousley and Johnson.
Justice O'Connor authored the majority opinion in Engle.
132. See Reed, 468 U.S. at 21 (Rehnquist, J., Burger, C.J., Blackmun & O'Connor, JJ.,
dissenting) ("Today's decision will make less sense to laymen than it does to lawyers.").
133. See e.g. Rodriguez de Quijas v. ShearsonlAmerican Express, 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989) ("If precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on
reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the
case that directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions."); U.S. v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000) (" [Als a constitutionally
inferior court, we are compelled to follow faithfully a directly controlling Supreme Court
precedent unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule it. We not may
not reject .... Supreme Court precedent, even if, in a particular case, it seems pellucidly
clear to litigants, lawyers, and lower court judges alike that, given the opportunity, the
Supreme Court would overrule its precedent," citing Bhandari v. First National Bank of
Com., 829 F.2d 1343, 1352 (5th Cir. 1987) (Higginbotham, J., concurring); Hasbrouck v.
Texaco, Inc., 663 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1981) ("District courts are bound by the law of
their own circuit."); Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 369
P.2d 937, 939 (Cal. 1962) ("Under the doctrine of stare decisis, all tribunals exercising
inferior jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior
jurisdictions."); see generally Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior
Court Precedents? 46 Stan. L. Rev. 817 (1994); Sanford Levinson, On Positivism and
Potted Plants: "Inferior" Judges and the Task of Constitutional Interpretation, 25 Conn.
L. Rev. 843 (1993).
134. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
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require this.' Therefore, if the governing decisional law of a
superior court (whether an intermediate court or the
jurisdiction's highest appellate court) dictated the resolution of a
particular legal issue at a given point in time before an inferior
court, a litigant's failure to raise the issue at that juncture
ordinarily should not prejudice the litigant's right to raise the
legal issue for the first time in a subsequent proceeding in the
same case. The rationale for this futility exception is both
fundamental fairness'36 and judicial economy.'37 This exception
also would serve to promote (rather than frustrate) federalism
and comity-the oft-cited rationale for the Supreme Court's
habeas corpus jurisprudence-because requiring objections on
135. See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Equity and Hierarchy. Reflections on the
Harris Execution, 102 Yale L. J. 255, 276 n. 106 (1992).
136. See O'Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. at 93; see also McCoy v. U.S., 266 F.3d at 1274
(Barkett, J., concurring in result) (criticizing as "patently unfair" the majority's refusal to
excuse a procedural default where, at the time of the trial, "every [federal] circuit [court] in
the country" had explicitly rejected the defendant's claim); U.S. v. McGuire, 79 F.3d at
1407 (Wiener, J., concurring) (contending that application of the "plain error" standard to
an unobjected-to claim that, at the time of trial, was foreclosed by extant appellate
precedent which was overruled only after the trial, is "patently unfair and logically
antithetical to the purpose of [the] plain error [rule]" and "perverse"), vacated, 99 F.3d
691 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); U.S. v. Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
("The supervening-decision doctrine reflects the principle that it would be unfair, and even
contrary to the efficient administration of justice, to expect a defendant to object at trial
where existing law appears so clear as to foreclose any possibility of success."); Meadows
v. Holland, 831 F.2d 493, 501-03, n.13 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Murnaghan, Phillips &
Sprouse, JJ., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for procedurally defaulting the habeas
petitioner's claim when, at the time of his trial, when no objection was lodged, "any
objection would have been futile" under controlling state appellate precedent; and
contending that the majority was "expect[ing] [petitioner's trial lawyer] to achieve
miracles")
137. Smith, 250 F.3d at 1077 (Wood, Rovner & Williams, JJ., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) ("I fear that the [court's] rule [that the futility of objecting did not
excuse the procedural default] will create an administrative nightmare not only for defense
counsel trying to represent their clients responsibly, but also for the district courts and this
court. After this, defense counsel will have no choice but to file one 'kitchen sink' brief
after another, raising even the most fanciful [claims] that could be imagined based on long-
term logical implications from existing precedents."); McGuire, 79 F.3d at 1412 (Wiener,
J., concurring) ("To penalize defendants for failing to challenge entrenched precedent
would only encourage frivolous objections and appeals."); Meadows, 831 F.2d at 501
(Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's refusal to excuse the procedural
default based on extant adverse precedent at trial as requiring defense counsel to engage
"in [a] recital of frivolous, non-valid matters [foreclosed under extant law], for how could
counsel say what was clearly not the law today would not become the law tomorrow?").
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clearly foreclosed federal constitutional grounds wastes state
courts' time. '
Such a futility exception to the procedural default doctrine
is perfectly in sync with the principal purpose of our judicial
system's requirement of error preservation, which is to permit an
inferior court to have the first opportunity to correct any error
and, thus, avoid an unnecessary appeal to a higher court or a
retrial. '39 Repeatedly, in this regard, the Supreme Court has
spoken of a procedural default occurring when a defendant
forgoes the "procedural opportunity" 140 to have his claim ruled
138. See Kit Kinports, Habeas Corpus, Qualified Immunity, and Crystal Balls:
Predicting the Course of Constitutional Law, 33 Ariz. L. Rev. 115, 134 (1991).
139. Engle, 456 U.S. at 128-29 (stating that the purpose of procedural default doctrine is
to afford a lower court "an opportunity to correct the defect and avoid problematic
retrials"); Muniz v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 1998) ("The rationale for the
contemporaneous objection rule is that it conserves judicial resources. A contemporaneous
objection allows the [lower] court to correct the error at the time it occurs .... ); U.S. v.
David, 83 F.3d 638, 643 (4th Cir. 1996)(affording a court "the opportunity to consider [a
legal objection and] possibly avoid the commission of an error" is "the very purpose[] of
the contemporaneous objection rule"); see generally Rhett R. Dennerline, Student Author,
Pushing Aside the General Rule in Order to Raise New Issues on Appeal, 64 Ind. L. J. 985,
987-88 (1989).
There are other, less important rationales for the procedural default doctrine,
including (1) affording the non-objecting party (as opposed to the court) the opportunity to
cure the alleged error so as to obviate an appeal of the issue; and (2) encouraging
development of the factual record regarding a legal issue so as to facilitate meaningful
appellate review. Id.; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88-89; Pfeifer v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 457 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 462 U.S. 523 (1983). Such rationales typically will not have any relevance
when an inferior court was utterly powerless in light of extant appellate precedent to grant
relief on an objection assuming that a defendant would have voiced it. In the overwhelming
majority of such cases, the claim is a "pure" issue of law based on fully developed,
uncontroverted facts. See e.g. O'Connor, 385 U.S. at 93.
In fairness, if the prosecution is faced with a defendant's objection raised for the
first time on appeal or collateral review that would have been futile to make in the court
below, the prosecution should be permitted, if it wishes, to make a credible showing that it
would have obviated the error if an objection had been made in the court below
(notwithstanding the fact that the then-governing law did not recognize an error). If such a
showing could be made, then the futility exception should not apply. It is highly doubtful
that the prosecution could make such a showing when, at the time of the prior proceeding,
then-governing law foreclosed relief on the claim.
140. See e.g. Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 221-22 (1988); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S.
at 534. Notably, in this regard, both the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that: "If a party does not have an opportunity to
object to a ruling or order, the absence of an objection does not later prejudice that party."
Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 46. In the same spirit as these rules, if
defendant lacked a meaningful "procedural opportunity" to object-because the ruling on
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on by a court with the power to correct an alleged error.141
Obviously, if an inferior court (whether a trial court or an
inferior appellate court) lacks the power to correct an error as a
result of extant appellate precedent of a higher court, no such
"procedural opportunity" exists and the primary rationale for
the contemporaneous objection rule does not exist.
This situation would not be one of subjective, "perceived
futility" of which the Court spoke in Smith v. Murray and
Engle,14 but, instead, one of objective, actual futility.'
43
Logically and equitably, such actual futility-as opposed to a
defendant's mere perception of futility when in fact an objection
would not necessarily have been futile-should excuse a
procedural default. If, however, a court before which a
defendant appears has the power to grant relief on particular
claim of error (i.e., a superior court addressing the same issue
has not already ruled that such a claim lacks merit), then the
futility exception should not apply. In Engle and Smith, the
Court appeared to embrace a variation of this logic when it
stated that "it is the very prospect that a state court 'may decide,
upon reflection, that [the defendant's claim] is valid' that
undergirds the established rule that 'perceived futility alone
cannot constitute cause" for a procedural default in a federal
habeas corpus case. ' 4 As discussed below, however, this"reconsideration possibility" rationale should be strictly limited
the objection was preordained by then-governing appellate precedent-the absence of an
objection should not later prejudice the defendant.
141. In Wainwright v. Sykes, the leading decision on procedural default, then-Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion appeared to recognize that the contemporaneous objection
rule is validly applied only where "the substantive right claimed [for the first time on
appeal or collateral review] could have been safeguarded if the objection had been raised
in a timely manner at trial." 433 U.S. at 89 n.13 (emphasis added). If extant appellate
precedent foreclosed a particular claim at the time of trial, the trial court could not have
"safeguarded" the claim. Likewise, Justice Rehnquist's concern in Sykes that wily defense
lawyers will "sandbag" by intentionally withholding an objection on a meritorious ground
during trial as "security" in the event a jury returns a guilty verdict, id. at 89, obviously
does not apply when a trial court had no power to grant relief on the claim.
142. Smith, 477 U.S. at 535 (quoting Engle, 456 U.S. at 130 n. 36) (emphasis added).
143. Other commentators have noted the difference between "perceived" and "actual"
futility. See Kinports, supra n. 138, at 134 n. 88; Jack A. Guttenberg, Federal Habeas
Corpus, Constitutional Rights, and Procedural Forfeitures: The Delicate Balance, 12
Hofstra L. Rev. 617, 651 n.182 (1984); Larry W. Yackle, The Reagan Administration's
Habeas Corpus Proposal, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 609, 655-56, n. 219, 651 n.197 (1983).
144. Smith, 477 U.S. at 535 (quoting Engle, 456 U.S. at 130 n. 36).
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to the situation when a defendant forewent an meaningful
opportunity to have a state or federal appellate court rule on the
merits of a claim and overrule its prior precedent. A meaningful
possibility for reconsideration of an issue does not exist when a
defendant appears before an inferior appellate court (e.g., a state
intermediate appellate court) or a "panel" of judges of an
appellate court (which has no power to overturn a prior
precedent of the full appellate court or precedent of a prior
panel). '
In other contexts besides procedural default, the Supreme
Court has designed procedural requirements to avoid futile
actions. For instance, in its decisions concerning the exhaustion
of administrative remedies-a doctrinal cousin of the procedural
default doctrine-the Court has recognized that such exhaustion
is not required when the administrative tribunal would be
"powerless" under governing law to grant any relief.'46 Such a
futility exception exists for state defendants who otherwise are
required to exhaust available state remedies under 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1) before filing federal habeas corpus petitions. 47 In
Lynce v. Mathis, 48 for example, although the habeas corpus
petitioner had not exhausted his federal constitutional claim in
the state courts before filing his federal habeas corpus petition,
the Court found that "exhaustion would have been futile"
because the Florida Supreme Court previously had rejected an
145. See nn. 133-35, supra, nn 184-85, infra, and accompanying text.
146. Montana Natl Bank of Billings v. Yellowstone County, 276 U.S. 499, 505 (1928)
("Finally, it is urged that plaintiff in error may not maintain this action because of its
failure to apply to the county board of equalization for an administrative remedy. We do
not stop to inquire whether under any circumstances such remedy was open to the taxpayer,
for the short answer is that the decision of the Supreme Court of Montana in [a prior case]
would have rendered any such application utterly futile since the county board of
equalization was powerless to grant any appropriate relief in the face of that conclusive
decision."). In McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 (1992), the Court reaffirmed its 1922
decision in Montana Natl Bank of Billings. See McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 148; see also Honig
v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 326 (1988) (exhaustion of administrative remedies not required
"where exhaustion would be futile or inadequate"); cf. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731
(2001) (under Prison Litigation Reform Act, an inmate is required to exhaust prison's
administrative remedies before filing § 1983 action even if inmate seeks only monetary
relief and administrative tribunal has no ability to award money damages, so long as the
administrative tribunal has authority to take some responsive action).
147. See Randy Hertz & James S. Liebman, 2 Fed. Habeas Corpus Prac. & Process, §
23.4a, at 989-90, n. 15 (4th ed., LexisNexis 2001) (citing cases).
148. 519 U.S. 433 (1997).
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identical claim in prior cases and counsel for the state had "not
suggested any reason why the Florida courts would have
decided petitioner's case differently 149 Likewise, in order to
prevent futility, the Court does not require, as part of the
exhaustion requirement, that state defendants file certiorari
petitions with the Court following an adverse ruling on a claim
in the state courts.5 ° The Court reasoned in that, because only a
tiny fraction of certiorari petitions in criminal cases are granted,
such a requirement would be pointless and cause a tremendous
waste of judicial resources. "Good judicial administration is not
furthered by insistence on futile procedure." '
Just as it has done in the exhaustion context and just as it
once did in the procedural default context in the 1960s,
beginning with O'Connor, the Supreme Court now should
recognize an "actual futility" exception to the procedural
default doctrine. Such an exception is appropriate both on direct
appeals and on collateral review. In Johnson, the Supreme Court
erroneously held that, if a claim would have been futile at trial
and only became legally viable on appeal based on supervening
appellate precedent, the plain error standard should nonetheless
apply.'52 As Fifth Circuit Judge Wiener cogently ar ued in his
concurring opinion in United States v. McGuire,' however,
application of the plain error standard to such a once-futile claim
given new life by supervening precedent is "patently unfair" in
that it "penalize[s] the defendant for failing to perform the
hollow and obnoxious act of objecting [at trial] in the face of
well-settled precedent to the contrary." 154 With respect to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which affords an
appellate court discretion to correct "plain errors" -as opposed
149. Id. at 436 n. 4. This holding is at odds with Engle's holding, in the procedural
default context, that a state supreme court should have the opportunity to "reconsider" its
position against a particular federal claim in prior cases. Engle, 456 U.S. at 130.
150. Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 680-81 (1948) ("Writs of certiorari are matters of
grace.... [F]ailure to file a [certiorari] petition [after exhaustion of all available state court
remedies] should not prejudice the right to a file a habeas corpus application in a [federal]
court." ); but cf O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999) (requiring, as part of the
exhaustion requirement, that a state defendant seek discretionary review of the state
supreme court before filing federal habeas corpus petition).
151. Wade, 334U.S. at681.
152. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 466.
153. 79 F.3d 1396, 1406 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated, 99 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
154. Id. at 1407 (Wiener, J., concurring).
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to Rule 52(a), which affords an appellate court no discretion to
disregard a preserved, "harmful" error-Judge Wiener correctly
pointed out that Rule 52(b) presupposes that a defendant has
"forfeited" a claim by failing to object in the court below. In the
actual futility scenario, however, a defendant "ha[s] nothing to
which he could object [under the prevailing law] and thus
nothing to forfeit."155 Rather than the restrictive plain error
standard, traditional harmless error analysis 156 should apply to
such a claim based on supervening law. 57
The Supreme Court in Johnson suggested that it had no
power to carve out any "exception" to Rule 52(b)'s treatment of
unpreserved claims. '58  The Court's claimed inability to
circumvent Rule 52(b)'s strictures is untenable for two reasons.
First and foremost, the Court's assertion in Johnson that plain
error review is mandatory in all cases where no objection was
made in the district court does not flow from the language of
Rule 52(b), which states in full: "A plain error that affects
substantial rights may be considered even though it was not
brought to the [trial] court's attention." 5 9 Such language simply
does not foreclose plenary review in the actual futility scenario.
Rather, the supposed strictures contained in Rule 52(b) are
actually contained in the Court's judicial gloss on Rule 52(b) in
United States v. Olano..
6
0
Second, in a closely analogous context, the Court has
shown no such reluctance to interpret 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the
jurisdictional statute that governs the Court's ability to review
state court judgments by writ of certiorari, in a manner that
permits unrestricted appellate review when a state court had
155. Id. at 1409.
156. See Chapman v. Cal., 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (setting forth the "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard for claims of federal constitutional error raised on direct
appeal); Kotteakos v. U.S., 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946) ("substantial and injurious effect of
influence" standard of review for claims of non-constitutional error raised on appeal;
codified in Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a)); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638
(1993) (adopting Kotteakos standard for claims of federal constitutional error raised on
federal habeas corpus review); Ariz. v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-09 (1991) (holding
that automatic reversal is required for "structural" errors that are not amenable to
traditional harmless-error analysis for "trial" errors).
157. McGuire, 79 F.3d at 1410-11 (Wiener, J., concurring).
158. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 466.
159. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (2002).
160. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
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applied a procedural default rule in an unreasonable manner.
Although the Court for over a century has held that an
"independent and adequate state law ground" (such as a valid
procedural default ruling by a state supreme court) will deprive
the Court of jurisdiction to review a federal constitutional claim
on the merits under any type of standard, the Court likewise has
long held that an "inadequate" state law ground does not
deprive the Court of jurisdiction. 16 In such a case, an
"inadequate" procedural default will be entirely excused, and
the claim will receive plenary review, subject only to ordinary
harmless error analysis, which is much less restrictive than plain
error review. 161
Indeed, this is precisely what occurred in O'Connor, where
the Court found that the futility of objecting under pre-Griffin
state precedent rendered the state supreme court's procedural
default ruling an "inadequate state law ground." 163 It makes
absolutely no sense for the Supreme Court to interpret 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257 as excusing an "inadequate" procedural default that
occurred in the state courts (thus, subjecting the claim to plenary
review) but to apply Rule 52(b)'s plain error standard and its
demanding judicial gloss to an identically "inadequate"
procedural default that occurred in federal district court. To do
so turns federalism on its head. As the Court stated in Kaufman
v. United States,'64 " [t]here is no reason to .... give greater
preclusive effect to procedural defaults by federal defendants
than to similar defaults by state defendants. To hold otherwise
would reflect an anomalous and erroneous view of federal-state
relations." 65
The Court's willingness to forgive procedural defaults on
appeal and eschew the plain error doctrine by engaging in
plenary review was apparent in City of Newport v. Fact
161. See e.g. Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1997); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. at 81; Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. 590, 626 (1874).
162. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-35 (discussing the difference between plenary review
under the traditional harmless error standard and review under the plain error standard).
163. O'Connor, 385 U.S. at 93; see also Cardinale v. La., 394 U.S. 437, 439 (1969)
(noting that, in O'Connor, it had treated the Ohio Supreme Court's procedural default
ruling as an "inadequate" state law ground).
164. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
165. Id. at 228.
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Concerts, Inc., a civil appeal which involved a challenge to
jury instructions not timely raised in the district court
proceedings under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 51. '67 In
City of Newport, the Court refused to apply the plain error
doctrine to the civil rights defendant's "procedural default" 168 on
appeal. The underlying substantive issue was whether the
district court erred in instructing the jury that punitive damages
were recoverable in a section 1983 civil rights action against a
municipality. 69 The Court reasoned that, because the law on the
punitive damages issue was in a state of flux among the lower
courts and had not previously been addressed by the Supreme
Court, the "novel" claim being asserted on appeal should not be
subjected to the "restrictive" plain error analysis.'7 ° The Court
"conclude[d] that restricting [its] review to the plain-error
standard would serve neither to promote the interests of justice
nor to advance efficient judicial administration." 171 Notably,
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author of the Court's subsequent
decisions in Johnson and Bousley and the author of the
dissenting opinion in Reed v. Ross,'72 joined the majority in City
of Newport. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented,
criticizing the majority's apparent double standard regarding the
plain error rule-one rule for criminal cases (which is less
166. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
167. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 provides: "No party may assign as an error the
giving or failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury
retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the
objection." Another provision of the civil rules requires a party to "make[] known to the
[trial] court the action which the party desires the court to take or that party's objection to
the action of the court and the grounds thereof .... Fed. R. Civ. P. 46 (2002)
168. City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 255 (describing the defendant's "failure to object to
the [jury] charge at trial" as a "procedural default" ).
169. Id. at 255. The majority, after dispensing with the restrictive plain error standard-
which, if applied, would have denied relief to the municipality in light of the fact that the
law on the issue was not "plain" at the time of the appeal-held that punitive damages are
not recoverable. Id. at 271.
170. Id. at 256.
171. Id. at 257.
172. 468 U.S. at 21 (Rehnquist, J., Burger, C.J., Blackmun & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
Ironically, the dissenters in Reed would have applied the procedural default doctrine to bar
consideration of the criminal defendant's claim as a result of his failure to raise the issue at
his trial, id. at 25-26, notwithstanding the fact that the claim in Reed was clearly more
"novel" at the time of his trial than the claim raised by the municipal defendant in the civil
rights action in City of Newport.
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forgiving to criminal defendants) and another for civil cases
(which is more forgiving to civil rights defendants).173
In the collateral review context, the actual futility exception
would require a federal court not simply to find "cause" for a
procedural default, as was suggested in the dicta in Reed v.
Ross. 7 4 Rather, the Court should entirely excuse the procedural
default and afford plenary review to the claim in the same
manner that the Supreme Court would afford plenary review to a
federal constitutional claim coming to the Court on direct review
under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 when the state court's procedural
default ruling is deemed inadequate.'75 On collateral review,
such a claim only would be subject to the modified harmless
error standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Brecht v.
Abrahamson. 1
71
V. APPLICATIONS OF THE "ACTUAL FUTILITY" EXCEPTION
Stating the actual futility exception in general terms is
much easier than applying it in the myriad situations that have
arisen in past cases. There are essentially five different futility
scenarios that raise the issue of whether, under each set of
circumstances, the courts should excuse a procedural default. As
173. City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 276 n 7 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the
"incongruity of [the majority's] result in light of parallel procedural requirements in the
criminal area"). The dissenters contended that: "The Court's conclusion that petitioners'
claim in this civil case should be heard despite the absence of plain error .... inverts the
Rules, in violation of their spirit as well as their letter .... The Court's conclusion ....
suggests that the courts should be stricter in enforcing procedural rules against prisoners
facing incarceration than against civil defendants facing money judgments. The Court's
priorities seem backwards to me." Id.
174. 468 U.S. 1, 17-18.
175. See e.g. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 123-26 (1990); Douglas v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 415, 422-23 (1965).
176. 507 U.S. at 637. According to the two leading commentators, the Brecht harmless
error standard and the "prejudice" component of the "cause and prejudice" standard are
identical. See Hertz & Liebman, supra n. 147, at § 26.3c, 1225; compare U.S. v. Frady,
456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) (broadly defining "prejudice" in the cause-and-prejudice
standard as "actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting the entire trial with error of
constitutional dimensions"), with Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (asking whether constitutional
error had "a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's
verdict"). If that were indeed the case, it would not make a practical difference whether a
formerly futile claim is subjected to plenary review on collateral review or, instead, is
subject to the cause-and-prejudice test, assuming that the futility constituted cause.
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discussed below, three of the five scenarios rise the level of
"actual futility" which justify excusing a procedural default.
The first scenario presents the easiest application of the
actual futility exception. It involves a state or federal
defendant's failure to raise a federal law claim that, at the time
of the procedural default, was squarely foreclosed by binding
Supreme Court precedent. A state or federal trial court would be
utterly powerless to grant any relief on the objection and, thus,
no legitimate governmental interest would be served by
requiring an objection. Likewise, a state or federal appellate
court-even a state supreme court or en banc United States
Court of Appeals-would be without power to overrule
precedent of the United States Supreme Court, even precedent
that "appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of
decisions." 17' The inferior appellate court "should follow the
[Supreme Court] case that directly controls, leaving to th[e]
Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."'
7
Despite the readily apparent logic of this application of the
actual futility exception-which has never been rejected by the
Supreme Court7 9 and which finds support in dicta in Reed v.
180Ross 8-numerous lower courts have refused to excuse
procedural defaults under such circumstances.' Such decisions
are erroneous.
177. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
178. Id.
179. In Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. at 177-78, which is discussed in Section III, supra, the
defendants explained their failure to file a direct appeal in early 1945 based in part on the
Supreme Court's decision in Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944), which, at that
time at least, "was very widely understood by the [blench and [b]ar" as being squarely on
point and foreclosing the defendants' claim. Sunal, 157 F.2d at 168-69 . Nevertheless, , a
majority of the Supreme Court, on a dubious basis, interpreted its earlier decision in Falbo
as not squarely foreclosing the defendants claim as of early 1945. Sunal, 332 U.S. at 180-
81. Therefore, the Court's decision in Sunal does not reject futility resulting from adverse
Supreme Court precedent directly on point as being a valid excuse for a procedural default.
180. 468 U.S. at 17-18 (1984).
181. See e.g. U.S. v. Aparco-Centeno, 280 F.3d at 1087-90 (subjecting defendant's claim
based on Apprendi v. N.J., 530 U.S. 466, which was decided while the defendant's appeal
was pending, to "plain error" review, even though at the time of the district court
proceedings, the issue was foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. U.S., 523 U.S. at 227 );
U.S. v. Terry, 240 F.3d 65, 72-73 (1st Cir. 2001) (same); U.S. v. Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F.3d
411,413-14 (9th Cir. 2001) (same); Pitts v. Cook, 923 F.2d 1568, 1571-73, n. 6 (11th Cir.
1991) (based on a state court's procedural default, refusing to address merits of defendant's
Equal Protection claim under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), despite the fact that,
at the time of the defendant's failure to raise the claim, Batson had not yet been decided
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The second futility scenario is similar to the first. It
involves the situation where, based on then-goveming precedent
of a state appellate court or an inferior federal appellate court
(i.e. a United States Court of Appeals), a defendant failed to
raise a foreclosed claim in a lower court governed by such
appellate precedent. That scenario was played out in O'Connor,
Smith v. Estelle, Engle, and Johnson (with the Supreme Court
taking conflicting positions in these cases)."' In each of the four
cases, at the time of the defendant's procedural default in the
trial court, controlling precedent of a superior appellate court
(other than the United States Supreme Court) would have
rendered an objection utterly futile because the trial court would
have been powerless to grant any relief on the defendant's
claim.'83 The Court in O'Connor and Smith correctly excused the
procedural default under such circumstances. Engle and
Johnson, which did not, should be overruled.
The third scenario-which occurred in Sunal and
Bousley-presents a more difficult application of the exception
than did the first two scenarios. It involves a defendant's failure
to appeal a claim to an intermediate state appellate court or a
"panel" of a federal circuit court that, under the court's rule of
operating procedure,'84 had no power to overrule then-goveming
appellate precedent of the same court or a superior appellate
and, instead, the Supreme Court's decision in Swain v. Ala., 380 U.S. 202 (1965), squarely
foreclosed defendant's Equal Protection claim); Jones v. Butler, 864 F.2d 348, 362-64 (5th
Cir. 1988) (same).
182. Compare O'Connor, 385 U.S. at 93 (excusing the procedural default), and Smith,
451 U.S. at 468 n. 12 (same), with Engle, 456 U.S. at 130 (not excusing the procedural
default), and Johnson, 520 U.S. at 466 (same).
183. See O'Connor v. State, 217 N.E.2d at 689 (O'Neill, Herbert & Brown JJ.,
dissenting), rev'd, 385 U.S. 82 ; Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129, 1133 ; Johnson, 520 U.S. at
466.
184. See e.g. 3d Cir. Internal R. of Operating P. 9.1. A vacated panel decision of the
Eighth Circuit held that the Constitution (in particular, Article III) required three-judge
panels to follow prior panel decisions, even if such decisions were unpublished. See
Anastasoff v. U.S., 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated on rehearing en banc on
other grounds, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000); but see Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155,
1159 (9th Cir. 2001) (disagreeing with the vacated panel decision in Anastasof]); see also
Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3d 260, 262 (5th Cir. 2001) (Smith, Jones &
DeMoss JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (noting the importance of the
controversial issue raised in Anastasoff).
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court (other than the United States Supreme Court).'85 This
scenario is somewhat similar to the prior scenarios discussed, in
that the intermediate appellate court is effectively "powerless" "6
to overrule the prior precedent of the same court. Although the
possibility of en banc review exists in any appeal to state or
federal intermediate appellate court, such en banc review-
which could overrule a prior "panel" decision-is extremely
rare in practice. En banc decisions comprise less than one
percent of a typical appellate court's rulings.1 87 In fact, many
federal circuit courts actively discourage petitions for en banc
review, some even threatening sanctions against counsel who
petition for en banc review in cases not deemed clearly worthy
of such "extraordinary" review.'
8
In Engle and Smith v. Murray, the Supreme Court stated
that the possibility that a state appellate court might choose to
reconsider an issue previously decided adversely to criminal
defendants in a prior case was a reason for not permitting futility
to serve as "cause" for a procedural default.'89 In neither case
did the Court deal with the third scenario discussed above,
where an intermediate appellate court (or a panel thereof) does
not have the power to reconsider prior precedent. Although a
defendant in the third scenario could seek reconsideration of
such adverse precedent by petitioning for en banc review by the
full intermediate appellate court, or by petitioning for
discretionary review by a state supreme court in the case of a
state intermediate appellate court that is bound by adverse
185. Every federal circuit court has a well-established rule that a three-judge "panel" of
the court cannot overrule the controlling decision of a prior panel absent intervening
authority from the en banc court or Supreme Court. See Douglas A. Berman & Jeffrey 0.
Cooper, In Defense of Less Precedential Opinions: A Reply to Chief Judge Martin, 60 Ohio
St. L. J. 2025, 2031-32, nn. 20-21 (1999) (citing cases). Many state intermediate courts
follow the same rule. See e.g. Cmmw. v. McCormick 772 A.2d 982, 984 n. 1 (Pa. Super.
2001); In Interest of L.D.B., 924 P.2d 642, 645 (Kan. App. 1996); O'Brien v. State, 478
So.2d 497,499 (Fla. App. 1985).
186. Moore v. Off. Personnel Mgt., 113 F.3d 216, 218 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
187. Berman & Cooper, supra n. 185, at 2031-32, n. 21 (noting that in fiscal year 1997,
there were only a total of sixty-five en banc dispositions in the federal system out of nearly
25,000 appeals terminated).
188. See e.g. 5th Cir. Loc. R. 35.
189. Smith, 477 U.S. at 535 (quoting Engle, 456 U.S. at 130 n. 36).
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precedent of the state supreme court, 9 0 requiring a defendant to
seek such en banc review or discretionary review-both of
which occur very infrequently-is not wise policy. "Good
judicial administration is not furthered by insistence on futile
procedure." 191
The fourth scenario involves a defendant, state or federal,
who fails to raise a claim on appeal before an appellate court
(other than the United States Supreme Court) which has the
power to recede from or overrule prior adverse precedent
foreclosing the claim. This situation was present in Smith v.
Murray.'92 In that case, the state defendant, on his direct appeal
to the Virginia Supreme Court, failed to raise a federal
constitutional claim that had been rejected in a prior decision of
that court.193 The Supreme Court held that, by not asking the
Virginia Supreme Court to reconsider its prior ruling, the
defendant had procedurally defaulted his claim for purposes of
subsequent federal habeas corpus review. 94 The fourth scenario
is one of "perceived," as opposed to "actual," futility because
there was a possibility, even if not a significant one, that the
190. In O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 847 (1999), the Court held that, as part of the
exhaustion requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) and (c), a state defendant must raise
a federal constitutional claim in a petition for discretionary review filed with the state
supreme court after the claim has been rejected by a state intermediate court. Id. at 847.
However, O'Sullivan did not involve the situation where the state intermediate court had
denied a claim based on extant, directly-controlling precedent of the state supreme court.
Therefore, O'Sullivan did not address the futility scenario discussed above. Cf Lance v.
Mathis, 519 U.S. 433,436 n. 4 (1997) (exhaustion doctrine does not require state defendant
to seek review by state supreme court of a claim rejected by that court in prior case; such a
procedural requirement would be "futile").
Assuming that O'Sullivan is considered inconsistent with the application of the
actual futility exception to the third scenario discussed above, its reasoning would not
apply to a federal direct appeal and, instead, would only apply to state defendants.
O'Sullivan was a federal habeas corpus case in which the Court was addressing the
statutory requirement that federal habeas corpus petitioners first exhaust state court
remedies before seeking relief from the federal courts on collateral review. 526 U.S.. at
851. Principles of federalism and comity, which were relevant in O'Sullivan, see id. at 844-
45, are obviously absent on a direct appeal in a federal case.
191. Wade, 334 U.S. at 681 (1948) (holding that a state defendant does not have to file a
certiorari petition with the United States Supreme Court after denial of relief by state
appellate courts before filing a federal habeas corpus petition).
192. 477 U.S. at 534-37.
193. Id. at 534-37; see also Gibson, 219 S.E.2d at 847 (noting that "the authorities are
divided" on the Fifth Amendment issue).
194. 477 U.S. at 535-37.
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state supreme court would overrule its prior adverse precedent
and grant the defendant relief.
The final scenario involves a defendant who failed to raise
a claim in an inferior court based on a good-faith, although
objectively mistaken, belief that then-governing precedent of a
superior court squarely foreclosed the claim. Unless, from an
objective standpoint, reasonable jurists would have considered
the claim squarely foreclosed by extant precedent, '95 the
procedural default doctrine should apply because it was not
actually futile to raise the claim. In other words, if the legal or
factual basis of a particular claim is objectively distinguishable
from extant adverse precedent-and, thus, such precedent does
not necessarily foreclose the claim 96 -then a defendant's
mistaken perception that the claim was foreclosed by the
precedent should not excuse the procedural default.
VI. CONCLUSION
The actual futility exception promotes fundamental fairness
and serves other legitimate purposes. First, it prevents the waste
of judicial resources by excusing litigants from burdening courts
with claims on which the courts have no power to grant relief.
Second, it prevents well-intentioned, zealous defense counsel,
who seek to err on the side of making "shotgun" objections in
order to avoid procedurally defaulting claims that might one day
possess merit, from being subject to ethical sanctions for raising
195. Cf Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 477 (1993) (employing such an objective
"reasonable jurists" standard to determine whether a claim requires application of a "new
rule of law" for retroactivity purposes). See also Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
196. This is not to say that a particular claim was actually futile simply because extant
precedent undermined-although did not squarely foreclose-the claim. Unless then-
controlling precedent "dictated" that the claim be denied, from an objective standpoint, cf
Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, the claim was not actually futile. For instance, in Sunal, the
defendants' mistaken belief that the Supreme Court's prior decision in Falbo squarely
foreclosed their claim was, according to the Court in Sunal, not objectively reasonable
(notwithstanding the fact that eight circuits also had this understanding). Sunal, 332 U.S. at
177-81. However, as discussed above, the defendants had an independent basis excusing
their procedural default in light of then-governing circuit court precedent that squarely
foreclosed their claim. See Sunal, 157 F.2d at 168-69; Kulick, 157 F.2d at 813-14. Thus,
Sunal falls under the third scenario mentioned above. If the defendants had only relied on
Falbo, and no such wall of circuit court precedent existed, the Supreme Court's conclusion
that their reliance on Falbo was unreasonable would be sufficient to procedurally default
their claim.
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issues then deemed "frivolous." 197 Finally, in cases involving
state defendants, the actual futility exception promotes-rather
than frustrates-principles of federalism and comity by
lessening the burdens on state courts faced with foreclosed
arguments made by defendants seeking to preserve federal
constitutional claims for subsequent federal court review.
In accordance with the centuries-old axiom that "[t]he law
does not require the doing of a futile act," 198 the Supreme Court
should modify its current error preservation jurisprudence so as
to create an "actual futility" exception as set forth above. The
Court should overrule or at least modify decisions such as
Johnson and Bousley and breathe new life into prior precedent
such as O'Connor.99
197. See e.g. McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp., 511 U.S. 659, 659-60 (1994) (per curiam)
(reversing Seventh Circuit's ethical sanctions imposed on a litigant for raising a claim
deemed "frivolous" by the court when, according to the Supreme Court, the claim was not
objectively frivolous at the time it was raised because other courts had found merit in the
claim; observing that the litigant raised the claim because he intended to preserve it for
further appellate review).
198. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980).
199. Stare decisis should not prevent the Court from overruling such faulty precedent.
See Hohn v. U.S., 524 U.S. 236, 251-52 (1998) ("The role of stare decisis .... is
somewhat reduced .... in the case of a procedural rule .... which does not serve as a
guide to lawful behavior.... Here we have a rule of procedure that does not alter primary
conduct." ).
